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It is di¢ cult to disagree with Vernon Smiths (2010) assessment of the
state of the art in experimental economics. It is informed by the experience
of someone who was there, right at the beginning of experimental economics.
Some of the problems he discusses, like the frequent failure of backward in-
duction, the often overlooked inuence of context, and the blurry distinction
of stage games vs. repeated games, are well known and - I think - appreci-
ated in the eld. Others, like the Other-peoples moneyproblem are new
and thought-provoking challenges to experimental economics that have only
begun to be addressed by researchers.
I will use this opportunity to argue for a reorientation of experimental
economics towards new and economically relevant questions. Like Vernon
Smith (2010) I shall ask Why so many experiments on seemingly narrow
topics? but I will give a very di¤erent answer. I do appreciate the view
that science has to progress in small steps, that you have to add one detail
at a time to an existing design, that you want to reduce errorby testing
a blizzard of narrowly prescribed circumstances that are not part of the
theory. Yet I am afraid that we are wasting our time (and endangering
the respect that other economists have for experimentalists) by playing too
much with some of our favorite toys.
1 Searching under the lamppost
Experimental economics is in danger of behaving like the famous drunk who
searches for his keys under the light even though he lost them in some dark
corner. I shall pick two examples which are discussed by Vernon Smith.
They may constitute relatively extreme cases but by no means are they
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exclusive examples for lampposting. Those two examples are the experi-
mental literatures on the dictator game and on bubbles in asset markets.
2 Please, not another dictator game!
Historically and logically, the rst dictator game experiment made a lot of
sense. It was a very cute variation of the ultimatum game that allowed
to discriminate among competing theories that tried to explain behavior in
the ultimatum game.2 But taking it in isolation, one really has to wonder.
Vernon Smith (2010) puts it very nicely:
From the perspective of the subjects, however, the dictator
game task must seem strange. You are recruited to the lab,
awarded a costless right to some of the experimenters money,
and given an opportunity to transfer any part or none of it to a
second anonymous person who has nothing to do except receive
the money. (It is not the standard interactive game in which
payo¤s jointly depend on the decisions of both players). The
Gods must be crazy!
What can economists learn from this experiment? Not much, I guess.
The percentage of subjects who give nothing to the other subject can be
as low as 10% or less3 if subjects play with other peoples moneyor can
be as high as 100% if it is the proposers money (Oxoby and Spraggon,
2008). I am sure, if someone runs an experiment where the receiver is a
hungrylooking child with begging eyes, the percentage of proposers who
give nothing approaches 0. Thus we learn that - depending on the context -
the percentage of proposers who give something positive can range between
2Many theorists would probably argue that there are also way too many experiments
on the ultimatum game (and I have to plead guilty to adding one more, my rst ultimatum
game experiment, Oechssler et al. 2008). Yet, although the ultimatum game is extremely
simple, it has many applications, at least as a subgame of more complex situations, e.g.
in principal-agent and bargaining models, and it has profoundly shaped the way we think
about those situations.
3The average percentage of zero-o¤ers in Oxoby and Spraggons (2008) receiver earn-
ing treatment is 8.43%.
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0 and 100%. Existing theories generally dont account for context and this
is a good thing. Economists are not in the business of producing models
that apply to an extremely narrow set of circumstances.
So the question is, why run dictator game experiments? No one seriously
argues that we need the experiments to predict what could happen in real
world situations. An experiment could have value in shaping the future
development of theory. But the only fact that consistently emerges from
dictator game experiments is that not everyone is always completely selsh,
and this does not come as a big surprise. Finally, given the variability in
experimental results, using the dictator game to calibrate social preferences
seems silly. So maybe we should allocate our time and money to better uses.
3 Asset markets with realistic features
In the typical asset market experiment, as pioneered by Smith et al. (1988),
bubbles occur even in a very austere environment. Usually one asset is
traded for a nite (often 10 or 15) number of trading periods. After each pe-
riod a stochastic dividend is paid. Thus, the fundamental value of the asset
is declining since it is given by the expected value of the dividend times the
number of remaining periods. Nevertheless, Smith et al. observed constant
or even increasing prices followed by crashes at the end of the experiment
(see Figure 1 for a sketch of a typical price path). Their experiment has
been replicated many times and with a large number of robustness checks.
It is not easy to explain those results. A rst feature of the experiments
in this literature is that there are dividends after each trading period. A
second, and of course related feature is that the fundamental value of the
asset is declining throughout the experiment. Clearly, both features are not
typical for real nancial markets. While dividend payments certainly are one
possible factor to explain bubbles in some real nancial markets, they cannot
account for bubbles in many other markets. For example, some dotcom
stocks, which arguably experienced on of the most pronounced bubbles in
history, never paid dividends (e.g. Dell, Yahoo!, Oracle). Also, commodities
do not pay dividends but experience bubbles nevertheless. Furthermore,
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Figure 1: A relatively typical price path in a market with falling fundamental
value (the funamental value is given by the step function)
dividends for most stocks are paid out only once per year, which could only
explain a very slow formation of bubbles. Thus, it seems that dividend
payments can only be a partial explanation for the formation of bubbles in
real nancial markets.
Vernon Smith is quite right in blaming a failure of backward induction
for the existence of bubbles in these simple experimental markets. Subjects
apparently dont make the leap from the last period, in which the asset loses
all its value as there are no further dividends, to the second last period to
the third last period etc. But who can blame them? Are these experiments
typical of real asset markets? Backward induction is only useful when there
is a nite number of periods which most asset markets dont have. Subjects
are told that they trade assets on a market so they probably expect to see
something similar to what they see on real markets: stochastic processes
with increasing or at least constant trend in most cases.
I guess its fair to say that the literature still has no persuasive explana-
tion why bubbles occur in markets with declining fundamental value. And
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I can o¤er no convincing explanation either apart from agreeing with Ver-
non Smith that confusion of subjects probably plays a role. Thus, the large
body of literature may be more about the ability of subjects to backward
induct and calculate expected values than about asset markets. One could
argue that - since there is still no generally accepted explanation - we need
more research and more experiments in this direction. And in a world with-
out scarcity we could do just that. But with scarcity, wouldnt it be more
productive to run experiments with more realistic features? What about
asset markets with constant fundamental values, what about communica-
tion among traders, what about several assets, what about a mixture of
informed and uninformed agents? And given current events, what about
incorporating a bailoutprobability?
I believe we need such explorations into the shady areas, into regions
that are not so welllit by earlier experiments. We also need experimental
protocols that make sure that results are not driven mainly by confusion of
subjects. As Vernon Smith (2010) aptly observes subjects often do not get
the message we thought should be transparentfrom the instructions. That
is, we need instructions that explain settings in plain language and we need
tests that make sure that subjects understand the instructions. But I also
think we need to allow subjects the time to learn through experience because
I fully concur with Smith when he states that people learn primarily by
doing, or observing others doing, not by deliberation and abstract analysis.
4 Conclusion
Some of the best known experiments, which are discussed and cited in nu-
merous other papers, which are replicated and modied in minor design
details, are cute, intellectually interesting but largely irrelevant. I would
argue that we as economists can gain more from experiments that focus on
economically relevant questions, even if this sometimes requires a fairly large
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